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CURRENT DECISIONS
ADmIRALTY-PRAcTIcE-REQUIREMENT OF SECURUTY FROm LIBELLANT WHERE
CROSS LIBEL is FI.LE.-The libellant filed a libel in persoumn against the owner
of certain vessels for breach of a charter party. The latter then filed a cross
libel in personam against the original libellant and moved that the libellant be
required to give security to respond in damages on the cross libel. Admiralty
Rule 50 (1920) 254 U. S. App'x 24 provides that when'ever a cross libel is filed
and the cross libellant has given security, the respondent in the cross libel shall
also give security "unless the court for cause shown shall otherwise direct."
The trial court allowed the motion, provided the cross libellant should first give
security to pay the libellant's claim. He did so, but the libellant refused to obey
the order of the court, which then entered a decree staying all proceedings until
its order should be obeyed. Held, that the trial court's action was erroneous.
Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co.
(1924, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct 420.
The Supreme Court interprets Rule 5o in the light of its history as applying
only when the original libel is in ren and the respondent has given security to
obtain dissolution of the attachment on his property. Any other interpretation
would put it in the power of the libellee to place an unjust burden on thelibellant This decision settles a much confused question. See Morse Iron
Works v. Luckenbach (1903, S. D. N. Y.) 123 Fed. 332; Interstate Lighterage
Co. v. Newton Creek Towage Co. (i919, E. D. N. Y.) 259 Fed. 318; cf. The
Rougenwnt [1893] P. 275; Williams and Bruce, Admiralty Practise (3d ed.
i9o2) io8.
BiLS AND NOTEs-UNTAMPED PAPER Nor IRREatLAR.-In an action on an
unstamped promissory note the defense was that the note was irregular and that
the plaintiff was therefore not a holder in due course as defined in the Negotiable
Instruments Law, sec. 52. A Federal statute provides a penalty of $ioo for
failure to affix a revenue stamp on a certificate of indebtedness. Act of Oct. 3,
1917 (40 Stat. at L. 1133). Held, that the plaintiff was a holder in due course.
(1923, Me.) 122 AtI. 859.
It has been held that the purchaser of an unstamped instrument is not a holder
in due course. Lutton v. Baker (I919) 187 Iowa, 753, 174 N. W. 599. But this
decision has been expressly overruled. Farmers' Savings Bank v. Neel (1922)
193 Iowa, 685, I87 N. W. 555. It is now well settled that the statutory penalty
does not preclude a purchaser from becoming a holder in due course. Metropoli-
tan State Bank v. McNutt (1923) 73 Colo. 291, 215 Pac. 151; Security State Bank
v. Brown (1923, Neb.) 193 N. W. 336; see 6 A. L. R. 1701; 21 A. L. R. 1125,
note; (1923) 8 IowA L. BULL. 92; NOTES (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 321.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--TRANSPORTATION ACT OF I920-RECAPTURE OF EARNINGS
PROVISION CONSTITUTioNAL.-The so-called "recapture" paragraphs of the Trans-
portation Act of i92o (41 Stat. at L. 456, 486) provided that any carrier receiv-
ing a net income in excess of a fair return (67o is now held to be a fair return)
should hold such excess as trustee for the United States, one-half to be retained
by the carrier as a reserve fund and the other half to go to a general railroad
revolving fund to be administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
commission was to use this fund in making loans to carriers to enable them to
refund maturing securities, -to buy equipment and in general to use for the benefit
of all the railroads. The plaintiff, a railway engaged in both interstate and intra-
state commerce, contested the validity of this statute. Held, that the statute was
constitutional. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States (1924, U. S-.) 44
Sup. Ct. 169.
By 1914 it was established that if intrastate rates between points within a state
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discriminated against interstate commerce between points within the state or in
adjoining states the federal government could regulate the intrastate rates to the
extent of the discrimination. Minnesota Rate Cases (1912) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup.
Ct. 729; Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (1914) 234 U. S. 342, 34
Sup. Ct. 833. Later, the Interstate Commerce Commission was recognized as
having the power to issue a state wide order requiring intrastate carriers to bring
their rates to a level with interstate carriers when the proceeds derived from the
intrastate rates were an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Railroad
Commission of Wisconsin v. C. B. & Q. R. R. (1922) 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct.
232; New York v. United States (1922) 257 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 239; see New
England Division Case (1923) 261 U. S. 184, 43 Sup. Ct. 27o. To divide the
excess enuring from a business engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce
and attempt to distribute it proportionally seems impractical; any excess due to
the purely intrastate business would be a-part of an indistinguishable whole. This
renders indispensable the incidental power of Congress to control that part of the
excess possibly due to intrastate business, and justifies holding the statute consti-
tutional. For the importance of the decision, see Bunn, The Recapture of Earn-
ings Provision of the Transportation Act (923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 213.
CONTRACTS-BRFACH OF CoNTRACT OF EmpLOYmENT-DsCHARGE BY SUBSEQUENT
EMPLOYER IN MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.-In an action for wrongful discharge, the
trial court rejected evidence offered by the defendant, that the plaintiff employee,
after the discharge but during the term of -the original employment, had been
discharged for dishonesty by a later employer. Held, that the judgment be
reversed as it may be shown in mitigation of damages. Burnside v. Bloxham
(1923, App. T.) 121 Misc. 672, 201 N. Y. Supp. 672.
In actions for wrongful discharge, the employer may show, in mitigation of
damages, the death of the employee after the discharge and before the expiration
of the term of employment. Rubin v. Siegel (ii, 1st Dept.) I88 App. Div. 636,
177 N. Y. Supp. 342; cf. Ga Nun. v. Palmer (1911) 2o2 N. Y. 483, 489, 96 N. E.
99, IOI. And wages lost due to illness during engagement by a subsequent
employer before the expiration of the term may be deducted. See Bassett v.
French (1895, N. Y. C. P.) io Misc. 672, 31 N. Y. Supp. 667; 3 Williston,
Contracts (192o) sec. 1339. Wages actually earned by the employee before the
expiration of the term, or which he would have earned had he used reasonable
diligence in seeking employment of the same general character, may be deducted.
American National Insurance Co. v. Van, Dusen (1916, Tex. Civ. App.) 185 S. W.
634; Bertholf v. Fisk (1918) i8z Iowa, 1308, 166 N. W. 713; (1922) 31 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 441. Though the instant case seems to be one of first impression,
it seems that any deliberate act of the employee incapacitating him can be shown
in mitigation. And though, as suggested by the court, an act of dishonesty is
rather an act of weakness than deliberation, there seems to be no reason for
applying a different rule. The same weakness in his original employ would
certainly have justified his discharge at that time by the defendant.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.-PRESUmPTION OF CoERcIoN BY HUSBAND.-The defendant
and her husband were jointly indicted for unlawful possession of a still for the
manufacture of liquor. At the time the still was seized the husband was not at
home. The defendant and her husband were convicted, and the defendant appealed.
Held, that in absence of rebutting evidence, the common law presumption of
coercion still prevailed, and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial.
Dressler v. State (1923, Ind.) 141 N. E. 8oi.
In view of the general modern emancipation of the wife, the instant case goes
far in adherence to the old common law presumption. The present tendency is to
treat the presumption as easily rebuttable. State v. Seahorn (1914) 166 N. C. 373,
81 S. E. 687; King v. Owensboro (192o) 187 Ky. 21, 218 S. W. 297; see (192o)
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29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 802; (1922) 31 ibid. 337. See (1922) 20 MIcH. L.
REV. 547.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO INFANT ILLEGALLY EMPLOYED-WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAw.-The plaintiff, a minor illegally employed by the defendant,
brought an action at law to recover for injuries received in the course of his
employment. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed. Held,
(two judges dissenting) that the judgment be reversed as he should have sued
under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Decker v. Pouvailsmith Corporation
(1923, App. Div. 2d Dept.) 20. N. Y. Supp. 874.
In New York a minor illegally employed is restricted to the remedy provided by
the statute. Boyle v. Cheney Pianw Action Co. (1920, 3d Dept.) 193 App. Div.
408, 184 N. Y. Supp. 374; Noreen v. Vogel (1921) 231 N. Y. 317, 132 N. E. lO2.
But in most jurisdictions the Workmen's Compensation Act is restricted in its
scope to lawful employments. See (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 5O9; (1921)
30 ibid. 532; (igi8) 31 HARv. L. REV. 803.
TORTS-NEGLIGNCE-INJURY TO A PERSON ASSISTING ANOTHER IN DANGER.-
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, went to a wholesale firm to transact business.
Due to the negligence of the defendants who were repairing the premises, a piece
of glass fell and injured the husband. His wife tried to pull him out of danger,
and in so doing strained her leg, causing a recurrence of thrombosis. Both husband
and wife sued to recover damages. Held, that both plaintiffs should recover.
Brandon v. Osborn, Garrett & Co. [1924, K. B.] 40 T. L. R. 235.
Although the point seems to be a new one in England, in this country a volunteer
who acts instinctively in an attempt to save a human life endangered by the
negligence of another may recover for injuries. Dixon v. N. Y. N. H. & H.
R. R. (191o) 207 Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 1030; Ridley v. Mobile & Ohio R. R.
(195o) 114 Tenn. 727, 86 S. W. 6o6; Corbin v. Philadelphia (19oo) 195 Pa. 461,
45 Atl. lO7O. Some American courts have extended this doctrine to cases of
volitional and even deliberative conduct that is not rash or reckless. Wagner v.
International Ry. (1921) 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437; but see NOTES (1922) 9
VA. L. REV. 376.
WILLS-INHERITANcE TAXATION-INcOME AccRUING DURING ADMINISTRATION
OF EsTATE-During the period of administration, an estate earned an income of
$5,0o6.o9. A statute provided that all estates passing to collaterals be subject
to a tax of five per cent of their clear value, and that when any species
of property other than money or real estate shall be subject to said tax, the tax
shall be on the appraised value thereof. Md. Gen. Code. i9O9, art. 81, secs. 120,
122. A tax was levied upon a basis including the accrued income. The lower
court allowed the entire tax and the administrator of the estate appealed. Held,
that the tax was properly levied. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. State (1923, Md.)
123 Atl. 50.
Under the statutes of most states the valuation of property for the purpose
of assessing inheritance taxes is made as of the date of the decedent's death. 2
Woerner, Ainerican Law of Administration (3d ed. 1923) 1075; 24 Ann. Cas.
i17, note; 39 ibid. 786, note; Oakley, Gross and Net Inheritance Tax Values
(I918) 2 MINN. L. REV. 274. The tax is considered to be upon the privilege of
succession. Matter of Penfold (1915) 216 N. Y. 163, 11O N. E. 497; (1923) 33
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 103. Some hardship may result where the property greatly
depreciates before it reaches the legatee, but the proper remedy is by express
provision for the exemption of losses. See R. I. Pub. Laws, 1916, ch. 1339, sec. 2;
Gleason & Otis, Inheritance Taxation (3d ed. 1922) 36. The construction placed
upon the statute in the instant case tends to introduce uncertainty as to the date
and standard of appraising estates. The different standards for the appraisal of
realty and personalty may also lead to practical difficulties.
